Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 71

Issue 2

Article 26

Spring 3-1-2014

Friend This: Why Those Damaged During the Facebook IPO Will
Recover (Almost) Nothing from NASDAQ
Thomas L. Short
Washington and Lee University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Thomas L. Short, Friend This: Why Those Damaged During the Facebook IPO Will Recover
(Almost) Nothing from NASDAQ, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1519 (2014).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol71/iss2/26
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Friend This: Why Those Damaged
During the Facebook IPO Will Recover
(Almost) Nothing from NASDAQ
Thomas L. Short*
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ................................................................... 1520
II. SRO Liability Today ...................................................... 1525
A. SROs Within the Present Regulatory Scheme
and NASDAQ’s Place Within It .............................. 1525
B. Determining Absolute Immunity ............................ 1528
1. Actions Afforded Absolute Immunity ................ 1530
2. Actions Denied Absolute Immunity .................. 1540
3. Absolute Immunity and SROs—The Tests
Employed ........................................................... 1545
III. NASDAQ’s Conditional Absolute Immunity in
Light of the Facebook IPO ............................................. 1546
A. The Events of the Facebook IPO ............................. 1547
B. The Present Law Applied to NASDAQ’s
Conduct During the Facebook IPO ......................... 1551
1. The Argument for Absolute Immunity.............. 1551
a. IPOs Constitute a Regulatory
Function........................................................ 1551
b. NASDAQ’s Actions in Effectuating the
Facebook IPO Are Entitled to Absolute
Immunity ...................................................... 1554
2. The Argument Against Absolute Immunity ..... 1556
* Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2014. I would like to thank my faculty Note advisor, Professor Christopher
Bruner, and the editorial board of the Washington and Lee Law Review for their
invaluable assistance in the development of this Note. I would also like to thank
my fiancée, Alison Faux, my friends, and family for their patience, love, and
support. Finally, thank you to General Lee, my dog, for forcing me outside and
allowing me to keep this process in perspective.

1519

1520

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1519 (2014)
a. IPOs Constitute a Private, For-Profit
Business Activity .......................................... 1556
3. Why a Court Should Find that
NASDAQ Is Entitled to Absolute
Immunity for Its Actions During the
Facebook IPO ..................................................... 1558
a. IPOs Will Be Considered a Regulatory
Function........................................................ 1558

IV. Regulatory Functions and Absolute Immunity:
A New Approach ............................................................ 1561
A. The New Approach .................................................. 1562
B. The New Approach as Applied to the
Facebook IPO........................................................... 1563
C. Counterarguments to the New Approach ............... 1564
V. Conclusion...................................................................... 1567
I. Introduction
Facebook, Inc. (Facebook) “went public” on NASDAQ on May
18, 2012, raising $16 billion—the third-largest initial public
offering (IPO) in the history of the United States.1 In the first 30
seconds of trading, 80 million shares changed hands.2 By the end
of the first day, 567 million shares had been traded.3 This was the
highest volume of shares traded in an IPO, “smashing” General
Motors Co.’s previous record of 450 million shares.4 The records
do not stop there, however.

1. April Dembosky & Telis Demos, Faltering Start for the New Facebook,
FT.COM (May 18, 2012, 11:23 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c7bfd916-a11311e1-9fbd-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2Jqp27Nkz (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (noting
that the Facebook IPO trailed VISA’s IPO in 2009 and General Motors’s IPO in
2010 in terms of funds raised) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. Julianne Pepitone, Facebook Trading Sets Record IPO Volume, CNN
MONEY (May 18, 2012, 4:05 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/18/technology/
facebook-ipo-trading/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
3 Id.
4. Id.
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The Facebook IPO also resulted in the largest number of
lawsuits ever filed due to an IPO.5 As of September 2012, only
four months after the IPO, twenty-nine securities class action
lawsuits had been filed.6 By December 2012, seven months after
the IPO, forty-one actions, and counting, were filed.7 As a result
of “system difficulties” experienced by NASDAQ, major market
makers and broker dealers lost approximately $500 million in the
IPO.8 Losses of this scale, and in this context, prompt a difficult
question: What is the extent of NASDAQ’s liability for its system
difficulties?9 The extent of NASDAQ’s liability is complicated.
Pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange
Act),10 Congress established a regulatory system that relies upon
self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to regulate and administer
the day-to-day conduct of the national securities exchanges under
the supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).11 Since that time, many of the SROs have become private,
5. See David Benoit, Another Facebook IPO Superlative: Most 2012
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2012, 1:37 PM), http://blogs.
wsj.com/deals/2012/09/26/another-facebook-ipo-superlative-most-2012-lawsuits/
(last visited Jan. 12, 2013) (“Facebook is getting sued. A lot.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. Id. (“In 2001, when the tech bubble was soaring and plenty of IPOs
went sour, no IPO faced more than four separate lawsuits [according to Stanford
University’s Securities Class Action Clearinghouse] . . . .”).
7. In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. & Deriv. Litig., 288 F.R.D. 26, 31
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (MDL No. 12-2389) [hereinafter SDNY Consolidation Order].
This is according to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York (SDNY), which, per the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, was
assigned the actions stemming from the Facebook IPO. Id. at 29.
8. John McCrank, UBS Says Nasdaq’s Facebook Compensation Plan
Inadequate, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2012/08/23/us-nasdaq-facebook-compensation-idUSBRE87L0W620120823 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
9. Legal actions for securities regulation violations have been filed against
Facebook, Facebook’s officers, and the underwriters who participated in the
IPO. These actions are outside the scope of this Note. For a broad overview of
those actions, see SDNY Consolidation Order, supra note 7, at 31–34; Julianne
Pepitone, Facebook IPO: What the %$#! Happened?, CNN MONEY (May 23, 2012,
6:06 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/23/technology/facebook-ipo-what-wentwrong/index.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2013) (providing a general overview of the
claims sparked by the Facebook IPO) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
10. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
11. See Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th
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for-profit corporations.12 NASDAQ is an SRO, a national
securities exchange, and a “quasi-private” regulatory entity that
“operate[s] as an additional layer of investor protection” in the
regulatory system.13 NASDAQ is also a private company with
$3.4 billion in gross revenues, net income of $383 million, and
over 173 million shares of common stock.14
In light of the governmental functions it provides, NASDAQ
is protected by absolute immunity when it performs its quasigovernmental, “statutorily delegated adjudicatory, regulatory,
and prosecutorial functions.”15 But NASDAQ is not entitled to
absolute immunity when it acts pursuant to its “nongovernmental” and “private business interests.”16 The question
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that SROs “conduct the day-to-day regulation and
administration of the United States stock markets, under the close supervision
of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission”).
12. Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory
Organizations Be Considered Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN.
151, 159–70 (2008) (describing the history of NASDAQ and the NYSE and
noting their present status as “public companies”).
13. STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
ANALYSIS 16, 45 (3d ed. 2012).
14. The NASDAQ OMX Grp., Inc., Annual Report, 1, F-4 (Form 10-K)
(2011) [hereinafter NASDAQ Annual Report].
15. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 (citing Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99
F.3d 49, 58, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts have not hesitated to extend the
doctrine of absolute immunity to private entities engaged in quasi-public
adjudicatory and prosecutorial duties.”); see also D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch.,
Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Barbara stood for the broader proposition
that a[n] SRO, such as [NASDAQ], may be entitled to immunity from suit for
conduct falling within the scope of the SRO’s regulatory and general oversight
functions.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l
Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that when
NASD “acts in [its] capacity to suspend trading, NASD is performing a
regulatory function cloaked in immunity”); Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
Dealers, No. 94-7058, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 41840, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14,
1996) (per curiam) (noting that while SROs “are entitled to absolute immunity
for actions that are prosecutorial or adjudicative in nature . . . absolute
immunity does not extend to acts that are purely investigatory or
administrative” (citations omitted)); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1985) (concluding that an SRO “is entitled
to absolute immunity for its role in disciplining its members and associates”).
16. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 (noting that “efforts to increase trading
volume and company profit, as well as the daily administration and
management of other business affairs” are considered serving “private business
interests” and are thus a “non-governmental function” not entitled to absolute
immunity).
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raised by the Facebook IPO is whether the $500 million loss was
a result of NASDAQ’s “statutorily delegated adjudicatory,
regulatory, and prosecutorial functions.” NASDAQ unequivocally
asserts that the actions it took during the IPO were undertaken
pursuant to its regulatory function and are thus covered by
absolute immunity.17 Additionally, NASDAQ has agreed to “pay
[the SEC] $10 million, the largest fine ever levied against an
exchange, to settle accusations that it had violated numerous
rules before and after the IPO” with its “poor systems and
decision making.”18
The problem with the Facebook IPO is that the law is
ambiguous about drawing the line between actions taken
pursuant to an SRO’s regulatory function and its “nongovernmental” and “private business interest[].”19 In the case of a
quasi-private SRO, such as NASDAQ, the law is unclear about
whether the SRO’s actions are protected by absolute immunity.
The two functions may even coincide in the same conduct, as they
appear to here.
The ambiguity that underlies NASDAQ’s liability is
important and problematic. The capital markets and SROs such
as NASDAQ are too important to the economic stability of the
United States and the world for there to be such confusion over
the extent of their liability.20 NASDAQ OMX Group, the company
17. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Amend Rule 4626–
Limitation of Liability, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67507, 77 Fed. Reg.
45,706, 45,714 (July 26, 2012) (SR-NASDAQ-2012-090) [hereinafter NASDAQ
Proposal], http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasdaq/2012/34-67507.pdf (noting that
“exchanges are . . . immune from civil liability for claims for damages caused by
actions taken in connection with the discharge of their regulatory duties).
NASDAQ explicitly states that “[i]n an exercise of its regulatory authority,
Nasdaq determined to proceed with the IPO . . . rather than postpone it.” Id. at
45,707 (emphasis added).
18. Nathaniel Popper, Nasdaq Is Fined $10 Million over Mishandled
Facebook Public Offering, DEALBOOK (May 29, 2013, 2:09 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/29/nasdaq-to-pay-10-million-fine-overfacebook-i-p-o/?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
19. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
20. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 16 (noting that NASDAQ has, on
average, $55.5 billion worth of shares trading daily on its exchange).
Furthermore, the total market valuation of the companies listed on NASDAQ is
$3.9 trillion. Id.
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behind the NASDAQ stock market, “owns and operates 24
markets, 3 clearing houses, and 5 central securities depositories,
spanning six continents—making [it] the world’s largest
exchange company.”21 It is “the largest single liquidity pool for US
equities,” and it is “the power behind 1 in 10 of the world’s
securities transactions.”22 Should an event suddenly impose
massive liability upon NASDAQ, even without bankrupting the
company completely, the knock-on effects would be felt
worldwide.23
The SEC is failing to “play[] an active role in overseeing . . .
Nasdaq . . . to ensure that [it is] protecting investors.”24 SEC
Chairman Mary Jo White agrees, stating that “the current nature
of exchange competition and the self-regulatory model should be
fully evaluated in light of the evolving market structure and
trading practices.”25 SEC Chairman White goes on to say that
“[t]he SEC should review whether the oversight of exchanges
‘continues to meet the needs of investors and public companies.’”26
This Note calls for the SEC to address the ambiguity in the law
with respect to whether SROs, such as NASDAQ, are acting
pursuant to their regulatory function.27
The Note is divided into three substantive Parts. Part II
provides an analysis of the present state of the law regarding
21. What is NASDAQ?, NASDAQ OMX, (2014) http://www.nasdaq
omx.com/aboutus/whatisnasdaq/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2014) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
22. Id.
23. See NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,714 (“If exchanges could be
called upon to bear all costs associated with system malfunctions and the
varying reactions of market participants taken in their wake, the potential
would exist for a single catastrophic event to bankrupt one or multiple
exchanges, with attendant consequences for investor confidence and
macroeconomic stability.”).
24. CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 16.
25. Andrew Ackerman, Scott Patterson & Jacob Bunge, Policing of
Exchanges Questioned, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2013, 8:04 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304906704579111483532305624
.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
26. Id. (quoting SEC Chairman White).
27. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 46 (noting that the SEC is
empowered to “approve, disapprove[,] or modify SRO rules as it ‘deems
necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory
organization’ under § 19 of the Exchange Act”).
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SRO absolute immunity. Part III describes the events of the
Facebook IPO and illustrates how the law, as it stands, is
inadequate to determine with any certainty whether NASDAQ’s
actions during the Facebook IPO were pursuant to its regulatory
function and warranted absolute immunity, or whether its
actions were pursuant to its nongovernmental private business
interests and did not warrant absolute immunity. Part IV
presents a new approach—first, NASDAQ, and other similarly
situated SROs such as the NYSE, should adopt living wills
specifying the national securities exchange’s operating costs for a
full year; second, those costs should be unconditionally protected
by absolute immunity; and finally, only those actions of SROs
undertaken pursuant to their prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions warrant absolute immunity.
II. SRO Liability Today
NASDAQ’s potential liability for the Facebook IPO is far
from settled. The extent, or very existence, of liability hinges
upon the crucial determination of whether the actions taken by
NASDAQ on May 18, 2012, were pursuant to NASDAQ’s
regulatory function or its nongovernmental private business
interests. Essentially, the question is whether NASDAQ was
acting as an SRO or as a private, for-profit corporation. Part II
discusses (A) the general framework of the present regulatory
system and NASDAQ’s place within it and (B) the concept of
absolute immunity, how it is determined, and what kinds of
actions it protects. This Part also details instances in which
absolute immunity has been afforded or withheld.
A. SROs Within the Present Regulatory Scheme and NASDAQ’s
Place Within It
Pursuant to the Exchange Act, Congress established a
regulatory system that relies upon SROs to “conduct the day-today regulation and administration of the United States stock
markets, under the close supervision of the United States
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Securities and Exchange Commission.”28 The SEC, in 1997,
authorized the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD), an SRO, to delegate its SRO functions to its subsidiary,
NASDAQ, permitting NASDAQ to “operate and oversee” the
NASDAQ stock market.29 The NASD “authorized Nasdaq to
develop, operate, and maintain the Nasdaq Stock Market, to
formulate regulatory policies and listing criteria for the Nasdaq
Stock Market, and to enforce those policies and rules, subject to
the approval of the NASD and ultimately the SEC.”30
Thereafter, NASDAQ served as an SRO pursuant to the
Exchange Act.31 In addition to operating as an SRO, NASDAQ
has, like many other SROs, become a for-profit corporation.32 In
2000, the NASD sold restricted shares of NASDAQ through a
private placement offering.33 Then, in 2002, NASDAQ’s shares
began trading on the Over the Counter (OTC) Bulletin Board,
and in 2005, via an offering of secondary shares, NASDAQ was
listed on the NASDAQ Stock Market.34 Now, NASDAQ is a
private, for-profit company with $3.4 billion in gross revenues,
net income of $383 million, and over 173 million shares of
common stock.35

28. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
29. See id. (citing Order Approving the Plan of Allocation and Delegation of
Functions by NASD to Subsidiaries, SEC Release No. 34-39326, 62 Fed. Reg.
62,385 (Nov. 21, 1997) (approving the delegation of powers whereby “Nasdaq
was given sole responsibility to operate and oversee the Nasdaq market”)); DL
Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d Cir. 2005)
(“The NASD has delegated some of its regulatory powers and responsibilities as
an SRO to Nasdaq.”).
30. DL Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 95.
31. See Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 (“NASDAQ serves as an SRO within
the meaning of the Securities Exchange Act . . . which vests it with a variety of
adjudicatory, regulatory, and prosecutorial functions, including implementing
and effectuating compliance with securities laws; promulgating and enforcing
rules governing the conduct of its members; and de-listing stock offerings.”).
32. When Did NASDAQ OMX First Go Public?, NASDAQ OMX (2013),
http://ir.nasdaqomx.com/faq.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. NASDAQ Annual Report, supra note 14, at 1, F-4.
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NASDAQ operates as both an SRO and a private,36 forprofit corporation.37 As a “private corporation, NASDAQ may
engage in a variety of non-governmental activities that serve its
private business interests, such as its efforts to increase trading
volume and company profit, as well as its daily administration
and management of other business affairs.”38 As an SRO,
NASDAQ acts as a quasi-governmental authority that effectively
“stands in the shoes of the SEC,” performing regulatory functions
that the SEC would otherwise perform.39 The resulting tension
has been noticed by the SEC, which has stated that “[a]s
competition among markets grows, the markets that SROs
operate will continue to come under increased pressure to attract
order flow. . . . [The resulting] business pressure can create a
strong conflict between the SRO[’s] regulatory and market
operations functions.”40 Crucially, it is along the distinction
between these two functions that the question of NASDAQ’s
liability hinges.
NASDAQ, even though it may act for the government in its
capacity as an SRO, is not afforded sovereign immunity like a
governmental agency.41 Instead, SROs are provided with
“absolute immunity when performing governmental functions”
but “cannot claim that immunity when they perform nongovernmental functions” or act in their “own interest[s] as . . .
private entit[ies].”42 Governmental functions include regulatory,
36. “Private” in this context reflects the fact that it is owned by private
individuals and not the government. NASDAQ OMX Group is not a private
company in the business sense given that it trades on the NASDAQ stock
market and is therefore most appropriately considered a public company.
37. See supra notes 28–35 and accompanying text (describing the unique
position of SROs such as NASDAQ that operate both as quasi-governmental
SROs as well as nongovernmental private, for-profit corporations).
38. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
39. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d
Cir. 2005) (quoting D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir.
2001)).
40. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1296 n.4 (quoting Concept Release Concerning
Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256,
71,261–62 (Dec. 8, 2004)).
41. See id. at 1296 (noting that SROs “lack the sovereign immunity that
governmental agencies enjoy”).
42. Id. at 1296–97 (“SROs are protected by absolute immunity when they
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adjudicatory, or prosecutorial activities that might ordinarily be
performed by a governmental agency—only in the performance of
those or similar activities do SROs have absolute immunity.43
Conceptually, SROs are entitled to absolute immunity when
“acting under the aegis of the Exchange Act’s delegated
authority.”44 It is an SRO’s “function as a quasi-governmental
authority that entitles it to absolute immunity.”45 Because an
SRO’s absolute immunity is conditioned on the nature of the
function being performed, the determination of what type of
function the SRO is performing is critical in situations where the
SRO is exposed to potential liability, such as the Facebook IPO.
B. Determining Absolute Immunity
In determining whether an action by an SRO warrants
absolute immunity, a court considers the “objective nature and
function of the activity for which the SRO seeks to claim
immunity.”46 The test does not hinge on an SRO’s subjective
perform their statutorily delegated adjudicatory, regulatory, and prosecutorial
functions. . . . [A]bsolute immunity must be coterminous with an SRO[’]s
performance of a governmental function.” (citing Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch.,
99 F.3d 49, 58, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]ourts have not hesitated to extend the
doctrine of absolute immunity to private entities engaged in quasi-public
adjudicatory and prosecutorial duties.”); D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258
F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001); Sparta Surgical
Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209, 1215 (9th Cir. 1998);
Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 94-7058, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS
41840, at *1–2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 1996) (per curiam); Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v.
Nat’’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 692 (5th Cir. 1985))).
43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (detailing how SROs are
entitled to absolute immunity when acting pursuant to their quasigovernmental functions but not when acting pursuant to their private, for-profit
interests).
44. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (quoting Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159
F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations omitted)).
45. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 93 (2d
Cir. 2005).
46. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1297; see also Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v.
Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012) (describing “a functional test to determine
whether an SRO is entitled to immunity based upon the facts . . . which requires
[the court] to look at ‘the nature of the function performed, not the identity of
the actor who performed it’” (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229
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intent or motivation.47 The propriety of actions or inactions is
irrelevant.48 The “central question [in] SRO-immunity cases is . . .
whether the plaintiff’s allegations concern the exercise of powers
within the bounds of the government functions delegated to it.”49
The Eleventh Circuit, in Weissman v. National Ass’n of Securities
Dealers,50 rejected the proposition that an SRO is granted
absolute immunity for “all activity that is merely ‘consistent
with’” the SRO’s delegated powers.51 This position puts the
Eleventh Circuit at odds with the Second Circuit, which does
afford absolute immunity for actions that are “consistent with” an
SRO’s delegated powers.52 The Second Circuit, in Standard
Investment Chartered v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers,53
stated that while “[t]here is no question that an SRO and its
officers are entitled to absolute immunity from private damages
suits in connection with the discharge of their regulatory
responsibilities . . . the doctrine ‘is of a rare and exceptional
character,’” and “courts must examine the invocation of absolute
immunity on a case by case basis.”54 Lastly, when deciding
whether to grant SROs like NASDAQ immunity for their actions,
courts frequently turn to the statutorily delegated responsibilities

(1988))).
47. Weissman, 500 F.3d at 1297.
48. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 07-CV2014, 2010 WL 749844, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010) (citing In re NYSE
Specialists S.E.C. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)), aff’d per curiam, 500
F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
49. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
50. 500 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
51. Id. at 1298. But see NYSE Specialists, 503 F.3d at 93, 99 (affording
absolute immunity for “specific functions” that are “‘consistent with’ the exercise
of power delegated to the SRO”); DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt.,
Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2005) (affording absolute immunity for actions
“consistent with the quasi-governmental powers delegated to it by the NASD
pursuant to the Exchange Act”).
52. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (detailing the Second
Circuit’s position).
53. 637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093
(2012).
54. Id. at 115–16 (citing Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 571 (2d
Cir. 1986)).
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of such bodies.55 The statutorily delegated responsibilities of
NASDAQ require it
to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, to
promote just and equitable principles of trade, to foster
cooperation and coordination with persons engaged in
regulating, clearing, settling, processing information with
respect to, and facilitating transactions in securities, to
remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a free
and open market and a national market system, and, in
general, to protect investors and the public interest.56

The following two sections provide examples of SROs being either
afforded or denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and
upon a variety of claims.
1. Actions Afforded Absolute Immunity
Absolute immunity is most simply determined in cases
involving an SRO acting pursuant to its prosecutorial or
adjudicatory function. In Austin Municipal Securities, Inc. v.
National Ass’n of Securities Dealers,57 the Fifth Circuit ruled that
an SRO, in that case NASD, was “entitled to absolute immunity
for its role in disciplining its members and associates.”58 The
Second Circuit concurred in Barbara v. New York Stock
Exchange,59 in which the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
brought disciplinary charges against an employee of a member of
the NYSE.60 In Barbara, the employee was permanently banned
from the exchange, despite the fact that the charges were later
reversed on procedural grounds.61 The Second Circuit had little
55. See Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012) to determine
“NASDAQ’s statutorily delegated responsibility”).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (2012).
57. 757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 692.
59. 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996).
60. See id. at 59 (noting that the employee “alleged abuses in the conduct of
the Exchange’s disciplinary proceedings”).
61. See id. at 52 (“Barbara alleged in his complaint that agents and officers
of the Division had wrongfully barred him from the Exchange floor, thereby
damaging Barbara’s reputation and causing him to lose employment
opportunities with two Exchange members, and ultimately to leave the
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trouble determining that the NYSE was absolutely immune from
damages arising out of the allegedly abusive performance of its
disciplinary function.62
Later, the Second Circuit, in D’Alessio v. New York Stock
Exchange, Inc.,63 ruled that the NYSE was entitled to absolute
immunity despite allegations that it had, in pursuit of its
disciplinary function against a member’s employee, incorrectly
interpreted and applied the securities laws as well as improperly
preformed its interpretive, enforcement, and referral functions,
specifically its “quasi-public adjudicatory” function.64 The United
States Attorney’s Office and the SEC, with the assistance of the
NYSE, suspended D’Alessio from the floor of the NYSE and
investigated him for pursuing trading strategies that D’Alessio
maintained were endorsed by the NYSE itself.65 The court stated
that the “alleged misconduct falls within the scope of [the] quasigovernmental powers delegated to the NYSE pursuant to the
Exchange Act and, therefore, conclude[d] that absolute immunity
precludes D’Alessio from recovering money damages in
connection with his claims.”66 The NYSE explicitly argued that “it
is absolutely immune from suit because the allegations in the
complaint are predicated on the NYSE’s improper performance of
the regulatory functions delegated by the SEC to the NYSE
pursuant to the Exchange Act.”67 The NYSE’s argument prevailed
at both the district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
securities industry.”).
62. See id. at 59 (“As a private corporation, the Exchange does not share in
the SEC’s sovereign immunity, but its special status and connection to the SEC
influences our decision to recognize an absolute immunity from suits for money
damages with respect to the Exchange’s conduct of disciplinary proceedings.”).
63. 258 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001).
64. See id. at 93 (“The NYSE’s alleged improper interpretation of the type
of conduct prohibited under [the securities laws] falls within the NYSE’s ‘quasipublic adjudicatory’ duties.”).
65. Id. at 97 (“D’Alessio contends that he relied on the NYSE’s
interpretation at the time he engaged in trading practices that were later
determined to be illegal.”). D’Alessio further contended that “the NYSE, in an
effort to keep its activities secret and curry favor with law enforcement
authorities, assisted the United States Attorney’s Office and the SEC in their
investigation and prosecution of D’Alessio by providing them with ‘false,
misleading and inaccurate information about . . . D’Alessio.’” Id. at 97–98.
66. Id. at 106.
67. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
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Second Circuit.68 Therefore, the NYSE was afforded absolute
immunity in D’Alessio irrespective of whether its actions were
improper, undertaken in error, or provided the basis for
D’Alessio’s fault.69
Generally, courts afford SROs absolute immunity for actions
taken pursuant to their prosecutorial or adjudicatory functions
with little difficulty.70 The determination hinges, roughly, upon
whether the conduct in question “share[d] . . . characteristics
[with] the judicial process.”71 In contrast, determining what
actions undertaken by an SRO are undertaken pursuant to its
regulatory function as opposed to its nongovernmental private
business interests can be far more problematic.72
In Sparta Surgical Corp. v. National Ass’n of Securities
Dealers,73 the Ninth Circuit determined that NASD was entitled
to absolute immunity in the face of damage claims arising out of
NASD’s decision to suspend trading and temporarily delist a
company.74 The court determined that “NASD is charged with the
duty and responsibility of monitoring its market carefully to
protect the investing public [and] [w]hen it acts in this capacity to
suspend trading, NASD is performing a regulatory function
cloaked in immunity.”75 Sparta may be the most straightforward
demonstration of the regulatory function.

68. Id.
69. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text (explaining how the
NYSE was afforded absolute immunity irrespective of whether the actions taken
by the NYSE were improper, in error, or caused harm to D’Alessio).
70. See supra notes 57–68 and accompanying text (providing examples of
courts holding SROs absolutely immune for actions taken pursuant to their
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions).
71. Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing
Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 688 (5th Cir.
1985) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510–13 (1978))).
72. See infra notes 73–164 and accompanying text (providing examples of
courts finding SROs entitled to absolute immunity and denied absolute
immunity for actions taken pursuant to their regulatory function).
73. 159 F.3d 1209 (9th Cir. 1998).
74. See id. at 1215 (“All of the damage Sparta claims flows from the trading
suspension and temporary de-listing. Accordingly, defendants are immune from
Sparta’s claims.”).
75. Id.
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In Standard Investment Chartered, Inc. v. National Ass’n of
Securities Dealers,76 two SROs, the NASD and the regulatory arm
of the NYSE, consolidated to form the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, Inc. (FINRA).77 FINRA was to be the sole
regulator for the private members of both the NASD and the
NYSE.78 NASD, as a condition of the consolidation, was required
to amend its bylaws to bring them in conformity with the
NYSE’s.79 Plaintiff asserted that the NASD, in its proxy
statement for a shareholder vote related to the bylaw
amendment, “falsely asserted that $35,000 was the maximum
amount that NASD . . . was authorized by the Internal Revenue
Service to pay members in connection with the merger.”80 In an
effort to skirt NASD’s absolute immunity, the plaintiff argued
that the action challenged pertained to an “alleged misstatement
. . . related to [NASD’s] finances, not their regulatory functions.”81
The Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) explicitly stated
that the “attempt to parse the proxy [statement] in order to
separate ‘financially-related’ statements from ‘regulatory-related’
statements is artificial and unconvincing.”82 The court
determined that the focus on the financial component of the
bylaws amendment missed the “entire purpose of the
reorganization,” which was regulatory, and thus afforded
absolute immunity.83 The district court found that “[i]t is patent
that the consolidation that transferred NASD’s and NYSE’s
regulatory powers to the resulting FINRA is, on its face, an
exercise of the SROs’ delegated regulatory functions and thus
entitled to absolute immunity.”84
In a per curiam decision, the Second Circuit, in Standard
Investment Chartered, Inc. v. National Ass’n of Securities
76. No. 07-CV-2014, 2010 WL 749844 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2010), aff’d per
curiam, 637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011).
77. Id. at *1.
78. Id.
79. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d
112, 114–15 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012).
80. Standard, 2010 WL 749844, at *1.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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Dealers,85 affirmed the district court’s ruling that “the proxy
solicitation, which was the only vehicle available to NASD for
amending its bylaws, was plainly ‘incident to the exercise of
regulatory power’ . . . and therefore an activity to which
immunity attached.”86 The Second Circuit found significant
(1) the fact that the NASD, as an SRO, cannot amend its rules
without SEC approval and (2) the fact that the SEC retains
discretion to amend the rules of any SRO, including the NASD.87
In a precursor to the Standard decision, the Second Circuit,
in In re NYSE Specialists Securities Litigation,88 ruled on
whether absolute immunity protected the NYSE from either
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly permitting the Specialist
Firms that operate on the NYSE to engage in improper trading
on their own behalf to the detriment of public investors.89 The
Specialist Firms play a pivotal role on the NYSE: each security
listed for trading is assigned to a particular specialist firm and to
“execute purchases and sales of a particular security, buyers or
sellers must present their bids to buy and sell to the specific
Specialist Firm assigned to that security.”90 Crucially, the
Specialist Firm adjusts the price of the security to facilitate a
liquid market in that security and correct imbalances in supply
and demand.91 By virtue of the Specialist Firms’ unique
middleman posture, they are in a position to improperly profit at

85. 637 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093
(2012).
86. Id. at 116 (internal citations omitted).
87. See id. at 116–17 (“The statutory and regulatory framework highlights
to us the extent to which an SRO’s bylaws are intimately intertwined with the
regulatory powers delegated to SROs by the SEC and underscore our conviction
that immunity attaches to the proxy solicitation here.”).
88. 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
89. See id. at 99 (determining whether “the Specialist Firms actively took
advantage of their unique position to self-deal and [whether] the NYSE
neglected or abandoned its regulatory duties and oversight of the Specialist
Firms by permitting and in some cases encouraging blatant self-dealing”).
90. Id. at 92.
91. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 14 (“Adjusting prices to
correct . . . imbalances of supply and demand is a critical task for the [S]pecialist
[Firm].”). The Specialist Firm also plays a “central role in maintaining liquidity
for that stock . . . [t]he specialist must sell when other investors are unwilling to
sell and must buy when other investors are unwilling to buy.” Id.
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the expense of the NYSE’s members.92 In the NYSE Specialists
case, the plaintiffs alleged that the Specialist Firms did just that,
in a variety of ways, with the possible intentional, knowing, or
reckless permission of the NYSE.93
The Second Circuit determined that the NYSE was entitled
to absolute immunity in this instance because the claims related
to the “proper functioning of the regulatory system[,]” and it was
“clear that the[] claims all involved the NYSE’s action or inaction
with respect to trading on the Exchange, which is indisputably
within the NYSE’s regulatory powers.”94 The court stated that
SROs are entitled to absolute immunity when they are “acting
within the scope of the powers granted to them.”95 The court also
noted that “the immunity protects the power to regulate, not the
mandate to perform regulatory functions in a certain manner.”96
With respect to the allegations that the NYSE “neglected or
abandoned its regulatory duties and oversight,” the court
explicitly stated that if the conduct of the SRO was “within the
ambit of the SRO’s delegated power, immunity presumptively
attaches, even where the SRO wrongly exercises that power.”97 The
Second Circuit was again stating that even where an SRO is in
the wrong, or acting improperly, the SRO will be entitled to
absolute immunity so as long as the “allegations of misconduct”

92. See supra note 91, infra note 93, and accompanying text (illustrating
the position and manner in which Specialist Firms can, and did, profit at the
expense of the NYSE’s members).
93. See NYSE Specialists, 503 F.3d at 93 (noting that the Specialist Firms
improperly engaged in interpositioning, trading ahead, freezing the book, and
manipulating the tick). “[I]nterpositioning” means the Specialist Firms
improperly positioned themselves between matching orders to make a profit for
themselves. Id. “[T]rading ahead” means the Specialist Firms improperly
undertook trades for their own accounts before undertaking trades for public
investors that the Specialist Firm knew would impact the stock price and thus
taking advantage of the Firm’s future insight into price movements. Id.
“[F]reezing the book” means improperly freezing the disseminated prices for a
security to permit the Specialist Firms to engage in trading for their own
account before undertaking trades for public investors. Id. “[M]anipulating the
‘tick’” means improperly changing the price of the security to affect its principal
trades. Id.
94. Id. at 99–100 (internal citations omitted).
95. Id. at 98.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 93, 99 (emphasis added).
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pertain to a “specific function” that is “‘consistent with’ the
exercise of power delegated to the SRO.”98
In DL Capital Group, LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.,99
the Second Circuit afforded NASDAQ absolute immunity for
suspending trading, canceling trades previously made, and
announcing those decisions.100 Due to what NASDAQ believed
was a system glitch, shares in Corinthian Colleges (COCO)
dropped precipitously for no reason, falling from $57.45 to $38.45
in twelve minutes.101 NASDAQ, in response to the large decline in
stock price, suspended trading in the shares for an hour.102 Fortyfive minutes after resuming trading, NASDAQ announced that it
was canceling all trades that took place in the twelve-minute
stock price drop time period.103 DL Capital went long in the
twelve-minute window (betting the stock price would eventually
rise, which it did), and then sold its shares after trading resumed,
but before NASDAQ announced the cancelation of trades, making
a profit.104 DL Capital’s profit was converted into a loss when
NASDAQ canceled the trades made during the twelve-minute
window because it meant that DL Capital’s initial purchase of
COCO was canceled but DL Capital’s sale was not.105 This
resulted in an “uncovered short sale”106 whereby DL Capital had
sold shares that it, after NASDAQ’s announcement and trade
cancellation, did not own.107 DL Capital therefore had to purchase
the requisite shares in the market, securing them at a price
98. Id.
99. 409 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2005).
100. Id. at 96.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Uncovered Option, (2013) INVESTOPEDIA.COM, http://www.investo
pedia.com/terms/u/uncovered-option.asp#axzz2KXF427vY (last visited Feb. 10,
2013) (describing an uncovered option, which is similar to an uncovered short
sale, as a transaction whereby the seller sells a security without owning the
underlying security, and thus must go out into the market to purchase the
security at market prices in order to complete the transaction) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
107. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 96 (2d
Cir. 2005).
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higher than its sale price, leading to a loss.108 DL Capital thus
alleged that it was injured “by having to cover the forced short
sale at a loss.”109
The Second Circuit ruled that NASDAQ’s actions were
afforded absolute immunity as NASDAQ was engaged in actions
“consistent with the quasi-governmental powers delegated to it by
the NASD pursuant to the Exchange Act.”110 In DL Capital, the
plaintiff attempted to bifurcate NASDAQ’s actions attacking “not
Nasdaq’s regulatory decisions to suspend trading, resume
trading, or cancel trades, but . . . the manner in which Nasdaq
publicly announced those decisions.”111 The district court and the
Second Circuit remained unconvinced, with the Second Circuit
stating that “[a]s the district court aptly put it, ‘[a]nnouncing the
suspension or cancellation of trades is as much a part of
defendants’ regulatory duties as is the actual suspension or
cancellation of trades.’”112
The Second Circuit went on to state that “allegations of bad
faith, malice and even fraud . . . cannot, except in the most
unusual of circumstances, overcome absolute immunity.”113 It is
clear that even the wrongful, improper, or errant performance of
duties incidental to the performance of an SRO’s regulatory
function will be protected by absolute immunity.114 This position
establishes a high bar for plaintiffs to clear in suits brought
against SROs in performance of their regulatory function.115
SROs have been granted absolute immunity in a variety of
situations and circumstances. SROs have been granted absolute
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 99–100.
111. Id. at 98.
112. Id. (second alteration in original).
113. Id.; see also Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp.
2d 260, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the Second Circuit has extended
absolute immunity to actions alleging fraud and bad faith by both individual
investors and members of the SRO), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007).
114. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text (explaining how courts
afford absolute immunity for actions incidental to the performance of an SRO’s
regulatory function).
115. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (noting the Second Circuit’s
position that even actions undertaken fraudulently, in bad faith, and with
malice warrant absolute immunity).
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immunity for (1) disciplining members and associates of the
exchange;116 (2) disciplining employees of exchange members;117
(3) deciding to suspend trading and delist a company from the
exchange;118 (4) deciding to ban a trader from the NYSE floor;119
(5) interpreting securities laws and regulations as applied to
exchange members;120 (6) referring exchange members to the SEC
and other governmental agencies for civil and criminal
enforcement under the securities laws;121 (7) suspending trading,
canceling previous trades made, and announcing such
decisions;122 and (8) “amend[ing] . . . [their] bylaws where . . . the
amendments are inextricable from the SRO’s role as a
regulator.”123 In the above cases, the courts invariably concluded
that, when objectively considering the nature and function of the
action at issue, the action was undertaken pursuant to the quasi116. See Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676,
692 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he NASD is entitled to absolute immunity for its role in
disciplining its members and associates.”).
117. See Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996)
(recognizing “an absolute immunity from suits for money damages with respect
to the Exchange’s conduct of disciplinary proceedings” against an employee of an
exchange member).
118. See Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d 1209,
1215 (9th Cir. 1998) (“NASD is charged with the duty and responsibility of
monitoring its market carefully to protect the investing public. When it acts in
this capacity to suspend trading, [or delist a company from exchange] NASD is
performing a regulatory function cloaked in immunity.”).
119. See D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104–06 (2d Cir.
2001) (noting that “[b]ecause these actions ‘share the characteristics of the
judicial process’ the NYSE is entitled to immunity from suit for claims based on
these actions” (quoting Barbara, 99 F.3d at 59)).
120. See id. (noting that SROs stand in the shoes of the SEC when
“interpreting the securities laws for its members and in monitoring compliance
with those laws,” and thus the SROs should be afforded the same immunity as
the SEC when performing those functions delegated to it by the SEC).
121. See id. (noting that an SRO is entitled to immunity when it acts
pursuant to its “quasi-prosecutorial” function).
122. See DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 97–
100 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting, in support, the district court, which stated that
“[a]nnouncing the suspension or cancellation of trades is as much a part of
defendants’ regulatory duties as is the actual suspension or cancellation of
trades” (quoting DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. 03-CV9730, 2004 WL 993109, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004))).
123. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d
112, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012).
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governmental prosecutorial, regulatory, or adjudicatory function
of the SRO, and thus warranting absolute immunity.124
The courts are highly deferential in affording SROs absolute
immunity for their actions.125 Austin, Barbara, D’Alessio, Sparta
Surgical, Standard Investment Chartered, NYSE Specialists, DL
Capital, and Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp.126 all
contain instances of courts affording absolute immunity to SROs
for actions taken pursuant to their prosecutorial, regulatory, or
adjudicatory functions in addition to, in some cases, actions
incidental to such functions.127 SROs were afforded absolute
immunity when they performed their quasi-governmental
functions abusively,128 improperly and in error (and irrespective
of the harm caused to others who may have detrimentally relied
upon the SROs error),129 wrongfully,130 in bad faith, with malice,
and even fraudulently.131 As noted by the court in Dexter,
“absolute immunity must be absolute” and even conduct
“incorrect and[/or] unlawful . . . is nevertheless protected”
irrespective of how “badly motivated, inept, or even unlawful” the
SRO’s conduct might have been.132 Given the diverse nature of
124. See supra notes 116–23 and accompanying text (detailing various
situations in which SROs have been afforded absolute immunity).
125. See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing various situations in which SROs have
been afforded absolute immunity upon a variety of claims).
126. 406 F. Supp. 2d 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir.
2007).
127. See supra Part II.B.1 (detailing various situations in which SROs have
been afforded absolute immunity upon a variety of claims).
128. See Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996)
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its
governmental function even when performed abusively).
129. See D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2001)
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions taken pursuant to its
governmental function when performed improperly, even when the SRO
allegedly caused harm to others who relied upon the SRO’s improper actions),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001).
130. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007)
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its
governmental function even when wrongfully exercising its power).
131. See DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 98
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that absolute immunity for an SRO cannot be overcome by
bad faith, malice, or even fraud).
132. Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263,
264 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007).
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actions afforded absolute immunity and the strength of the
absolute immunity itself, it seems difficult to imagine instances
in which courts would not grant SROs absolute immunity, yet
immunity has been denied in certain circumstances.
2. Actions Denied Absolute Immunity
In Weissman v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, the
Eleventh Circuit denied absolute immunity to NASDAQ.133 In
Weissman, NASDAQ asserted absolute immunity for any liability
arising from the active promotion of NASDAQ, and several
companies listed on it, including WorldCom.134 The
advertisements, which were detrimentally relied upon by an
investor, specifically referenced NASDAQ’s belief in the need for
the companies listed on NASDAQ to “provide accurate financial
reporting in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounted [sic]
Principals (‘GAAP’)” and for the companies to be “‘supported by a
Knowledgeable Audit Committee.’”135 The advertisement also
provided a list of companies that supposedly endorsed this
opinion, including WorldCom.136 It was alleged that at the time of
the advertisements, NASDAQ was aware that WorldCom was not
in compliance with NASDAQ’s audit committee requirements.137
WorldCom collapsed within months after the advertisements
were promulgated in a massive “accounting scandal that created
billions in illusory earnings,” almost completely wiping out the
plaintiff’s investment.138
133. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (affirming the district court’s denial of absolute immunity as
NASDAQ’s activity did not serve an adjudicatory, regulatory, or prosecutorial
function).
134. See id. at 1298–99 (noting that pursuant to “NASDAQ’s view, even
advertisements that promote the sale of a particular stock and serve no
regulatory function whatsoever would be shielded by absolute immunity,
because advertisements are ‘consistent with’ NASDAQ’s role as an SRO”).
135. Id. at 1299.
136. Id.
137. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 05–61107, 2004 WL
3395190, at *2 (S.D. Fla. June 18, 2004), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 468 F.3d
1306 (11th Cir. 2006), rev’d en banc, 500 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
138. Simon Romero & Riva D. Atlas, Worldcom’s Collapse: The Overview;
WorldCom Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2002),
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The Eleventh Circuit, reversing itself en banc, stated that
absolute immunity is “appropriate only when an SRO is
preforming regulatory, adjudicatory, or prosecutorial functions
that would otherwise be performed by a government agency” and
that “absolute immunity must be coterminous with an SRO’s
performance of a governmental function.”139 In this instance, the
court determined that the advertisements were private business
activity, and “‘[w]hen conducting private business, [SROs] remain
subject to liability.’”140 Therefore, in this instance, NASDAQ was
not afforded absolute immunity.141 The court specifically stated
that “NASDAQ represents no one but itself when it entices
investors to trade on its exchange and, specifically, when it
suggests that particular companies are sound investments.”142
The court was clear that activities undertaken “in the service of
NASDAQ’s own business, not the government’s” do not warrant
absolute immunity.143
It may appear that NASDAQ’s actions were unquestionably
undertaken pursuant to its nongovernmental private business
interests. As the Eleventh Circuit itself stated, SRO’s are not
entitled
to
absolute
immunity
for
“such
distinctly
nongovernmental conduct” as advertising.144 The result in
Weissman, however, followed a tortuous journey through the
lower courts wherein the Eleventh Circuit reversed itself.145 In
the district court, NASDAQ’s motion to dismiss pursuant to
absolute immunity was denied.146 NASDAQ appealed to a panel
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-world
com-files-for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html?src=pm (last visited Jan. 8, 2014)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Weissman, 2004 WL
3395190, at *1 (describing the fall of WorldCom as a “well publicized accounting
fraud and collapse”).
139. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
140. Id. at 1299 (quoting Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers,
159 F.3d 1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998)).
141. See id. at 1299 (concluding that NASDAQ’s actions were not protected
by absolute immunity in this case).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1295.
146. See id. (“The district court denied the motion in all respects.”).
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of the Eleventh Circuit that reversed the denial of absolute
immunity in part and affirmed it in part.147 Finally, the Eleventh
Circuit, en banc, “affirm[ed] the district court’s determination
that NASDAQ does not enjoy immunity for the conduct alleged,”
overruling the previous Eleventh Circuit panel decision.148
Weissman demonstrates how, even in what appears to be a
clear-cut case of an SRO performing functions that were
undertaken pursuant to its nongovernmental private business
interests, the courts struggle with separating those private
actions from actions undertaken pursuant to an SRO’s regulatory
function.149 Weissman also demonstrates how hesitant the courts
are to find an SRO exposed to any sort of liability.150 Every single
one of the cases cited by Weissman that addresses SRO liability in
the financial sphere found the SRO entitled to absolute
immunity.151 This illustrates the protection afforded to SROs
such as NASDAQ in the financial context.
Weissman is the only circuit level opinion in which an SRO in
the financial sphere is denied absolute immunity. Widening the
search parameters to federal district courts reveals only one case,
not including the Weissman district court opinion, in which an
SRO in the financial sphere was denied absolute immunity.152 In
147. See id. (noting that the Eleventh Circuit panel “reversed the district
court’s denial of absolute immunity with regard to . . . portions of Weissman’s
complaint . . . but affirmed the denial of absolute immunity with regard to the
remainder of Weissman’s complaint”).
148. Id.
149. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text (describing the
procedural history of Weissman, wherein the Eleventh Circuit reversed itself).
150. See supra notes 144–48 and accompanying text (noting how a final
result was reached only after the Eleventh Circuit reversed itself).
151. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293 passim (11th
Cir. 2007) (en banc). In one instance, Zandford v. National Ass’n of Securities
Dealers, the D.C. Circuit remanded the absolute immunity question to its
district court. Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, No. 94-7058, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 41840, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 14, 1996) (per curiam) (remanding “to
the district court for reconsideration of whether, and to what extent, the alleged
misconduct . . . may be shielded by absolute immunity”). The district court
determined that the SRO’s actions were protected by absolute immunity and,
even if they were not, the plaintiff’s claims were time barred; the circuit court
affirmed. Zandford v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18, 24
(D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 221 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
152. See Opulent Fund, L.P. v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. C-07-03683,
2007 WL 3010573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007) (denying NASDAQ absolute
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Opulent Fund v. Nasdaq Stock Market, Inc.,153 the Northern
District of California denied NASDAQ absolute immunity.154
In Opulent, the plaintiffs were private investment
partnerships trading in stock options on the Nasdaq-100.155 On
the day in question, plaintiffs alleged that NASDAQ
miscalculated the value of the Nasdaq-100.156 Plaintiffs
determined this based upon their own calculation of the value of
the Nasdaq-100 using the NOOP of the underlying stocks.157 This
miscalculation had a significant impact on the plaintiffs’ portfolio
of options, causing the plaintiffs to suffer a far greater loss on
their contracts than if the value of the index had been correctly
calculated.158
The Opulent court agreed with the plaintiffs that “pricing an
index is not a ‘regulatory function’ and therefore not cloaked in
absolute immunity.”159 The court felt that NASDAQ established
this index to profit from the selling of market price data and that
in doing so, NASDAQ “‘represent[ed] no one but itself.’”160 The
court stated that “Nasdaq’s duty to accurately calculate and
disseminate an index price does not function to protect investors;
instead, Nasdaq’s actions function to create a market and
immunity).
153. No. C-07-03683, 2007 WL 3010573 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007).
154. See id. at *5 (“Nasdaq’s market facilitating actions at issue in this case
were non-regulatory, and hence there is no absolute immunity.”).
155. Id. at *1
The Nasdaq-100 is an index of the one-hundred largest non-financial
securities traded on the Nasdaq Exchange. The index is weighted by
the market value of each of the 100 component securities, whose
values depend on their NASDAQ Official Opening Price (“NOOP”).
The SEC has reviewed and approved the structure of the Nasdaq-100
index . . . . The SEC also approved Nasdaq’s calculation and
publication of NOOP prices. Nasdaq encourages investors to use the
Nasdaq-100 index to create derivatives, and the accurate and timely
reporting of the index’s value is critical to the existence of the market
for Nasdaq-100 derivatives.
(internal citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *5.
160. Id. (citing Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299
(11th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
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increase trading.”161 Importantly, the court stated that “SEC
approval of a rule imposing a duty on an SRO is not the sine qua
non of SRO immunity; engaging in regulatory conduct is.”162
Furthermore, the court noted that the fact that “the SEC
approved the pricing formula against which Nasdaq’s conduct
will be judged does not automatically convert Nasdaq’s conduct
into an immunized ‘regulatory function.’”163 Ultimately, the court
ruled that NASDAQ’s “market facilitating actions at issue in this
case were non-regulatory” and therefore, NASDAQ was not
entitled to absolute immunity.164
The Opulent court affirmatively stated that even if the SEC
has approved the specific methods employed by the SRO, or if the
SEC has approved the imposition of duties upon the SRO, that
does not mean that the SRO’s actions employing those methods or
preforming those duties are regulatory functions warranting
absolute immunity.165 This is significant because during the
Facebook IPO, like in Opulent, a system approved by the SEC
and employed by NASDAQ—the Nasdaq Cross—failed, causing
harm to others.166 Likewise, the SEC approved NASD’s
delegation of authority to NASDAQ, to “operate and oversee” the
NASDAQ stock market in 1997.167

161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. See supra notes 162–64 and accompanying text (detailing how, per
Opulent, the approval of the SEC does not unequivocally convert approved
actions into regulatory conduct).
166. See infra notes 219–22 and accompanying text (noting that the
NASDAQ Cross was approved by the SEC); infra Part III.A (detailing the events
of the Facebook IPO).
167. See Order Approving the Plan of Allocation and Delegation of Functions
by NASD to Subsidiaries, Exchange Act Release No. 34-39326, 62 Fed. Reg.
62,385, 62,391 (Nov. 21, 1997) [hereinafter NASD Delegation Order] (approving
the delegation of authority from the NASD to NASDAQ to “operate and oversee”
the NASDAQ stock market).
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3. Absolute Immunity and SROs—The Tests Employed
Aside from Weissman, Opulent, and the occasional lower
state court,168 the courts have found SROs entitled to absolute
immunity.169 The lack of cases in which courts have denied SROs
absolute immunity is a testament to the breadth of protection
afforded to SROs by their absolute immunity.170 As Weissman
and Opulent make clear, however, SROs will not always be
afforded absolute immunity.171
As was demonstrated above in Standard Investment
Chartered, NYSE Specialists, DL Capital, Dexter, Weissman, and
Opulent, the courts resort to vague language when determining
whether an SRO was acting pursuant to its regulatory function or
a nongovernmental private business interest.172 Courts will
inquire as to whether the SRO was acting “coterminous with
[the] . . . performance of a governmental function”;173 acting
“‘incident to the exercise of regulatory power’”;174 “acting within
the scope of the powers granted to them”;175 acting “consistent
with the quasi-governmental powers delegated to [the SRO]”;176
168. See Platinum Partners Value Arbitrage Fund, Ltd. P’ship v. Chi. Bd.
Options Exch., 976 N.E.2d 415, 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012), appeal denied, 981
N.E.2d 1003 (Ill. 2012) (denying SRO defendants absolute immunity).
169. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of
claims).
170. See supra Part II.B.2 (providing examples of SROs being denied
absolute immunity).
171. See supra notes 133–64 and accompanying text (detailing the court’s
refusal to find the actions of the SROs in Weissman and Opulent entitled to
absolute immunity).
172. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of
claims).
173. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
174. Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 637 F.3d
112, 116 (2d Cir. 2011) (per curiam), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1093 (2012) (citing
In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007)).
175. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2007).
176. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 99–100
(2d Cir. 2005). But see Weissman, 500 F.3d 1298 (rejecting the proposition that
an SRO is granted absolute immunity for “all activity that is merely ‘consistent
with’” the SROs delegated powers).
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acting in such a way that “the conduct “ar[ose] out of the
discharge of [the SRO’s] duties under the Exchange Act”;177 and
whether or not the SRO was acting in such a way that it
“represent[ed] no one but itself.’”178 The various, equally vague
standards suggest that a coherent method for determining
whether an SRO’s actions were undertaken pursuant to its
regulatory function or pursuant to its nongovernmental private
business interests would prove beneficial.179 The approach
detailed in Part IV intends to clarify this ambiguity.180
III. NASDAQ’s Conditional Absolute Immunity in Light of the
Facebook IPO
As Part II has demonstrated, courts have little difficulty
identifying when SROs are acting pursuant to their prosecutorial
and adjudicatory functions.181 Courts, however, struggle to
determine when SROs are acting pursuant to their regulatory
function as opposed to their private, for-profit business
interests.182
The Facebook IPO illustrates the complexity of applying
these vague standards to complicated actual events to ascertain
whether the SRO in question, NASDAQ, was acting pursuant to
its regulatory function or was acting pursuant to its
177. Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104 (2d
Cir. 2001), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066
(2001)).
178. Opulent Fund, L.P. v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. C-07-03683, 2007
WL 3010573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007) (quoting Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of
Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc)).
179. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of
claims).
180. See infra Part IV.A (detailing the new approach).
181. See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text (providing examples of
SROs afforded absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions).
182. See supra notes 172–78 and accompanying text (providing examples of
the vague language courts resort to when determining whether an SRO was
acting pursuant to its regulatory function or a nongovernmental private
business interest).
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nongovernmental private business interests. Part III, in subpart
A, provides a very brief narrative of the Facebook IPO.183 Subpart
B applies the present law of SRO absolute immunity to
NASDAQ’s conduct during the Facebook IPO in an attempt to
determine if NASDAQ is entitled to absolute immunity.
A. The Events of the Facebook IPO
NASDAQ establishes the opening price of an IPO through a
process known as the “Nasdaq Cross” (Cross).184 The Cross
process begins at 7:00 A.M. on the day of the IPO, and from then
on, NASDAQ accepts orders for shares in the IPO.185 Those orders
can be entered or canceled freely, although no information on the
orders is publically disseminated until the “Display-Only Period,”
and no orders are actually completed until the Cross itself
executes.186 The Display-Only Period begins fifteen minutes prior
to the scheduled release time of the IPO, which in the case of
Facebook was 11:00 A.M.187 During the Display-Only Period,
NASDAQ disseminates information about the auction price and
the auction volume on NASDAQ’s public data feeds at five-second
intervals.188 During this period, members of NASDAQ may
continue to enter and cancel orders in the IPO.189 “Over the
course of the Display-only period, market participants develop an
understanding of the state of supply and demand, changes in the
indicative price typically become smaller, and the indicative
volume typically increases.”190 After the Display-Only Period has
183. For a detailed description of NASDAQ’s IPO process and the specific
issues NASDAQ faced during the Facebook IPO see NASDAQ Proposal, supra
note 17. This level of detail is beyond the scope of this Note.
184. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,708–09.
185. Id. at 45,708.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 45,708–09.
188. Id. at 45,708.
189. Id.
190. Id. NASDAQ can extend the Display-Only Period up to six times, each
for five-minute increments. Id. NASDAQ would do so if it “detect[ed] an order
imbalance in the security,” which would be determined if the current reference
price disseminated by NASDAQ differed by more than 5% or $0.50 in the fifteen
seconds before the Cross executed or “all buy or sell market orders w[ould] not
be executed in the [C]ross.” NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, Rule 4120 (c)(7)(C).
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come to an end, the “IPO [C]ross executes, the Nasdaq official
opening price is disseminated, a bulk trade” is executed, and
messages confirming individual executions for Cross-executed
shares are sent to market participants.191 The Cross calculates
the execution price by “determining the price that will maximize
the number of shares executed and, in the case of multiple prices
providing the same maximum number of shares executed,
selecting the price nearest to the offering price.”192
On the day of the Facebook IPO, the Cross failed to execute
correctly, falling into a continuous loop of calculations and
recalculations. At 11:05:10 A.M., NASDAQ attempted to
“conclude the quoting period, execute the Cross and print the
opening trade,” a procedure that, when initiated, results in the
Cross application running its final calculation to match buy and
sell orders and then formulating the opening trade.193 The system
is designed to capture changes to the existing orders even while
the system is calculating the Cross up until one second before the
Cross is completed, incorporating the changes made while the
calculation for the Cross is being processed.194 In the Facebook
IPO, however, the system got stuck in a continuous loop: “after
the initial calculation of the Cross was completed, but before the
opening trade was printed, additional order modifications were
Limit Up-Limit Down Plan and Trading Halts, NASDAQ OMX (June 13, 2006),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednod
e=chp%5F1%5F1%5F4%5F1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequ
ityrules%2F (last visited Jan. 8, 2014) [hereinafter NASDAQ Stock Market
Rules] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
191. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,708.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.; See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos.
1 and 2 Thereto to Establish the Nasdaq Halt Cross, Exchange Act Release No.
34-53488, 71 Fed. Reg. 14,272, 14,274 (Mar. 21, 2006) (SR-NASD-2006-015)
[hereinafter Proposal for NASDAQ Cross] (describing the NASDAQ Cross as
capable of processing further changes to the existing orders while the system is
processing within one second of the final calculation should the changes exceed
a predetermined threshold or variance). But see Letter from Daniel Keegan,
Managing Dir., Citigroup Inc., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n (Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter Citi Comment Letter] (stating that the
NASDAQ Cross system, which “continued to accept cancels and modifications to
orders up to one second before the opening [C]ross,” contained a “known design
flaw that resulted in a similar technology issue dating back to Fall 2011”),
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/CitiCommentLetter.pdf.
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received by the system . . . . As designed, the system re-calculated
the Cross to factor in the new state of the book.”195 As the Cross
was recalculating, new changes were again received by the
system, and, after the recalculation was completed but before the
opening trade was printed, the system again recalculated the
Cross to incorporate the received changes.196 Thus, the system fell
into a continuous loop of recalculations.197
NASDAQ, after a “system modification,” was able to break
the continuous cycle and complete the Cross at 11:30:09 A.M,
twenty-five minutes late.198 But, “only orders received prior to
11:11:00 a.m. participated in the 11:30:09 a.m. Cross.”199 Thus,
any orders “entered between 11:11:00 a.m. and 11:30:09 a.m.”
were neither calculated in the 11:30:09 a.m. Cross nor executed
by NASDAQ.200 Robert Greifeld, NASDAQ OMX Group’s Chief
Executive Officer, stated that “[a]s many as 30 million shares
worth of trading were affected by the glitch.”201
As a result of its “system modification,” NASDAQ was not
disseminating transaction confirmation messages (order
confirmations).202 NASDAQ did not transmit transaction
confirmation messages until 1:50 P.M., over two hours after the
market for Facebook had opened.203 NASDAQ believed that, “[i]n
spite of the absence of confirmation messages[,]” market
participants would have been largely unaffected by the
absence.204 Citi, on the other hand, believed that the lack of
195. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,709.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Jenny Strasburg, Jacob Bunge & Gina Chon, Nadaq’s Facebook
Problem, WALL ST. J. (May 21, 2012, 8:02 AM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052702303610504577416530447015656.html (last visited
Jan. 12, 2013) (noting how the CEO of NASDAQ described the IPO as not
NASDAQ’s “finest hour”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
202. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,709.
203. Id.; see also Citi Comment Letter, supra note 194, at 7 (“In the period
between 11:30 a.m. and 1:50 p.m. . . . system issues prevented Nasdaq from
disseminating Cross transaction reports.” (citation omitted)).
204. See NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,709 (“[M]arket
participants . . . would reasonably have had certain expectations for the
execution or non-execution of their orders.” (emphasis added)).
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transaction confirmation messages meant that “legions of
investors were unable to make rational trading decisions because
they had no idea whether they owned Facebook stock or not.”205
UBS concurred, stating that of its losses “in excess of $350
million, the vast majority . . . resulted directly from Nasdaq’s
unprecedented failure to deliver execution reports for tens of
thousands of trades executed in the opening [C]ross [of] the
Facebook IPO.”206 Citi believed that the lack of transaction
confirmation messages resulted in “investors submitting multiple
redundant orders based on the belief that the orders were not
going through. . . . In other cases, investors submitted
cancellations [for their purchase orders] before receiving order
confirmations, but were stuck with the stock.”207 Other
individuals were affected by the lack of transaction confirmation
messages, and they were left wondering whether they owned any
Facebook shares at all: “People didn’t know where their orders
stood, and it became a big guessing game.”208 It was even
reported that some brokerages, four days after the IPO, “weren’t
sure if some of their orders had closed, or at what price.”209

205. Citi Comment Letter, supra note 194, at 7.
206. Letter from Mark Shelton, Gen. Counsel UBS Americas, UBS AG, to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, at 2 (Aug. 22, 2012)
[hereinafter UBS Comment Letter] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
207. Citi Comment Letter, supra note 194, at 7.
208. Hibah Yousuf, Facebook Trader: Nasdaq “Blew it,” CNN MONEY (May
21, 2012, 3:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/21/markets/facebooknasdaq/index.htm?iid=EL (last visited Jan. 21, 2013) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Strasburg, Bunge & Chon, supra
note 201 (“Brokers and traders who placed orders [between 11:11:00 a.m. and
11:30:09 a.m.] didn’t know the status of those transactions until 1:50 p.m.”).
Some brokers, traders, and investors “said they had put in orders to sell shares
early in the day, but those orders didn’t go through. By the time they discovered
that in the afternoon, the share price had fallen, so they were able to sell only at
the lower price.” Id. Others “said that because they didn’t have confirmations of
their earlier buy orders from Nasdaq, they weren’t able to sell those shares until
after 1:50 p.m.” after the share price had fallen. Id. Still others stated that
“orders . . . didn’t go through, or were filled at an inferior price later in the
day . . . [or] went through [but] weren’t confirmed until hours later.” Pepitone,
supra note 9. “That left investors unsure about how many shares they bought or
sold, and at what price.” Id.
209. Pepitone, supra note 9.
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B. The Present Law Applied to NASDAQ’s Conduct During the
Facebook IPO
To be afforded absolute immunity, NASDAQ must
demonstrate that the actions it took during the Facebook IPO
were within its quasi-governmental prosecutorial, regulatory, or
adjudicatory functions.210 Because the actions NASDAQ took to
effectuate the Facebook IPO do not “share . . . characteristics
[with] the judicial process,” NASDAQ did not act pursuant to its
adjudicatory or prosecutorial functions.211 Therefore, the inquiry
pertains solely to whether NASDAQ acted pursuant to its
regulatory function. Even if effectuating IPOs is within
NASDAQ’s regulatory function, NASDAQ’s actions during the
Facebook IPO should be analyzed to determine if they are
entitled to absolute immunity.212
1. The Argument for Absolute Immunity
To prevail on a claim of absolute immunity, NASDAQ must
demonstrate that (1) IPOs are an exercise of its quasigovernmental regulatory function and (2) that NASDAQ’s actions
during the Facebook IPO, however characterized, warrant
absolute immunity.213
a. IPOs Constitute a Regulatory Function
NASDAQ could argue that IPOs are undertaken pursuant to
its regulatory function given the extensive regulatory authority
delegated to NASDAQ by the NASD (approved by the SEC), the
210. See supra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of SROs afforded absolute
immunity for actions taken pursuant to their prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and
regulatory functions).
211. Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing
Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 688 (5th Cir.
1985) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510–13 (1978))).
212. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs being afforded
and denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of
claims).
213. See supra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of SROs being afforded
absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims).
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SEC’s explicit approval of the NASDAQ Cross (the system
NASDAQ uses to effectuate IPOs), and the breadth of regulatory
authority provided by Congress to NASDAQ as a national
securities exchange.214 The strength of each argument is analyzed
in turn.
In 1997 NASDAQ was given “sole responsibility to operate
and oversee the Nasdaq market.”215 NASDAQ was authorized to
“develop, operate, and maintain the Nasdaq Stock Market, to
formulate regulatory policies and listing criteria for the Nasdaq
Stock Market, and to enforce those policies and rules.”216
The breadth of authority delegated to NASDAQ to oversee
the NASDAQ stock market, and the fact that NASDAQ had “sole
responsibility” to do so, provides support for the assertion that
part of the regulatory function conferred to NASDAQ was the
effectuation of IPOs.217 After all, the only way to grow or even
maintain a stock market is to add companies to it via IPOs.218
Furthermore,
the
SEC
explicitly
approved
the
implementation of the NASDAQ Cross—the system employed by
NASDAQ to effectuate IPOs.219 The proposal pertaining to the
implementation of the NASDAQ Cross described the various
ways in which the Cross would impact the effectuation of IPOs.220
The Commission’s approval of the very system employed by
NASDAQ to effectuate IPOs generally, and the Facebook IPO
specifically, provides evidence that the Commission approved of
NASDAQ’s role in developing and building the NASDAQ stock

214. Infra notes 215–27 and accompanying text.
215. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167.
216. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d
Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
217. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167.
218. See NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 190, at Rule 3351(i)
(“Trading Practice”) (“No member or person associated with a member shall
execute or cause to be executed, directly or indirectly, on Nasdaq a transaction
in a security subject to an initial public offering until such security has first
opened for trading on the national securities exchange . . . .”).
219. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Establish the Nasdaq
Halt Cross, Exchange Act Release No. 34-53687, 71 Fed. Reg. 24,878 (Apr. 27,
2006) (SR-NASD-2006-015) [hereinafter NASDAQ Cross Approval] (approving
the implementation of the NASDAQ Cross).
220. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim.
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market through IPOs.221 It is clear that the SEC was not only
aware of, but approved of, NASDAQ effectuating IPOs on the
NASDAQ stock market.222
Finally, NASDAQ, as a national securities exchange, is
required to “promote just and equitable principles of trade,”
“facilitat[e] transactions in securities,” “remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market and a
national market system,” and “protect investors and the public
interest.”223
Arguably, IPOs accomplish all four objectives. IPOs promote
just and equitable principles of trade and facilitate transactions
in securities generally, as well as those within a particular
company, because what other process “remove[s] impediments to
and perfect[s] the mechanism of a free and open market” like a
company “going public”—allowing the average investor to freely
“trade” and take a stake in a, previously unavailable, company?224
IPOs also trigger mandatory disclosure obligations for companies
listed on national securities exchanges.225 This “protect[s]
investors and the public interest,” because more information
about a company is now available to the market.226 The Second
Circuit, in reference to the NYSE, an SRO comparable to
NASDAQ, stated that all “action or inaction with respect to
trading on the Exchange . . . is indisputably within the [SRO’s]
regulatory powers.”227

221. See NASDAQ Cross Approval, supra note 219, at 24,878–79 (approving
the implementation of the NASDAQ Cross). In adopting the Cross, the SEC
stated that it was “consistent with the requirements of the [Securities
Exchange] Act and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to a national
securities association.” Id.
222. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim (referencing
the various ways in which the Cross would affect IPOs); NASDAQ Cross
Approval, supra note 219, at 24,878–79 (approving the NASDAQ Cross).
223. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012).
224. Id.; see CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 392 (noting how IPOs have
“downside[s] for the company’s pre-existing owners[:] bringing in more equity
owners dilutes the potential upside return”).
225. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 169 (noting how “Congress
adopted mandatory disclosure for companies with securities listed on a national
securities exchange as part of the Exchange Act of 1934”).
226. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5).
227. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2007).
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Therefore, NASDAQ can argue that IPOs constitute a
regulatory function of NASDAQ and NASDAQ, when effectuating
IPOs, may warrant absolute immunity.228
b. NASDAQ’s Actions in Effectuating the Facebook IPO Warrant
Absolute Immunity
NASDAQ’s actions during the Facebook IPO, however
characterized, will not forfeit NASDAQ’s absolute immunity:
“absolute immunity must be absolute.”229
Absolute immunity protects SROs even when they perform
their quasi-governmental functions abusively,230 improperly and
in error (irrespective of the harm caused to others who may have
detrimentally relied upon the SRO’s error),231 wrongfully,232 in
bad faith, with malice, and even fraudulently.233 As noted in
Dexter, conduct “incorrect and[/or] unlawful . . . is nevertheless
protected” by absolute immunity irrespective of how “badly
motivated, inept, or even unlawful” the SRO’s conduct might
have been.234 Absolute immunity even covers actions taken
incidental to the performance of an SRO’s regulatory function if
performed wrongfully, improperly, or errantly.235
228. Supra notes 215–27 and accompanying text.
229. Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263
(S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 219 F. App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007).
230. See Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996)
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to their
governmental function even when performed abusively).
231. See D’Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2001)
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its
governmental function even when performed improperly and, even when the
SRO, allegedly, caused harm to others who relied upon the SROs improper
actions), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1066 (2001).
232. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir. 2007)
(affording absolute immunity to an SRO for actions take pursuant to its
governmental function even when wrongly exercising its power).
233. See DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 98
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting that absolute immunity for an SRO cannot be overcome by
bad faith, malice, or even fraud).
234. Dexter, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 264.
235. See DL Capital Grp., 409 F.3d at 98 (affording absolute immunity for
actions incidental to the performance of an SRO’s regulatory function even when
performed wrongfully, improperly, or errantly).
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NASDAQ’s actions during the Facebook IPO could arguably
be characterized as wrongful, improper, incorrect, badly
motivated, or inept.236 But even if NASDAQ’s actions, undertaken
pursuant to its regulatory function,237 were so characterized,
NASDAQ would still be afforded absolute immunity.238
NASDAQ’s actions probably could not, even arguably, be
characterized as abusive, undertaken in bad faith, with malice,
fraudulently, or unlawfully.239 And if NASDAQ’s actions were so
characterized, NASDAQ would still be afforded absolute
immunity.240 Given the extent to which courts have afforded
SROs absolute immunity, despite the manner in which the SROs
have performed their quasi-governmental functions, it is clear
that NASDAQ’s actions, which could be characterized in a
number of ways, would warrant absolute immunity.241
Therefore, NASDAQ could argue that an IPO, in general, is
an exercise of its quasi-governmental regulatory function
warranting absolute immunity.242 NASDAQ should then be able
to assert confidently that the actions taken, or not taken, by it
during the Facebook IPO, however characterized, would warrant
absolute immunity.243

236. See supra Part III.A (detailing the events of the Facebook IPO).
237. See supra Part III.B.1.a (arguing that the effectuation of IPOs is
pursuant to NASDAQ’s regulatory function).
238. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as wrongful,
improper, incorrect, badly motivated, or inept).
239. See supra Part III.A (detailing the events of the Facebook IPO).
240. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as abusive,
undertaken in bad faith, undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful).
241. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as wrongful,
improper, incorrect, badly motivated, inept, abusive, undertaken in bad faith,
undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful).
242. See supra Part III.B.1.a (demonstrating that the effectuation of IPOs is
pursuant to NASDAQ’s regulatory function and therefore warrants absolute
immunity).
243. See supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute immunity cannot be
successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized as wrongful,
improper, incorrect, badly motivated, inept, abusive, undertaken in bad faith,
undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful).
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2. The Argument Against Absolute Immunity

NASDAQ will be denied absolute immunity if the
effectuation of IPOs is found to constitute a private, for-profit
business activity.244 The SEC itself acknowledges that “[a]s
competition among markets grows, the markets that SROs
operate will continue to come under increased pressure to attract
order flow. . . . [The resulting] business pressure can create a
strong conflict between the SRO[’s] regulatory and market
operations functions.”245
a. IPOs Constitute a Private, For-Profit Business Activity
It could be argued that the effectuation of IPOs constitutes a
private, for-profit business activity of NASDAQ given the positive
effect IPOs have on NASDAQ’s bottom line and its “trading and
brand value.”246
NASDAQ aggressively solicited Facebook to have Facebook
IPO on the NASDAQ stock market as opposed to the NYSE.247 To
do so made business and financial sense: At stake was NASDAQ’s
244. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc) (“‘When conducting private business, [SROs] remain subject to
liability.’” (quoting Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 159 F.3d
1209, 1214 (9th Cir. 1998))). Activities undertaken “in the service of NASDAQ’s
own business, not the government’s,” do not warrant absolute immunity. Id.
245. Id. at 1296 n.4 (quoting Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation,
SEC Release No. 34-50700, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,261–62 (Dec. 8, 2004))
(emphasis added).
246. See Whitney Kisling, NYSE, Nasdaq Vie for Facebook IPO, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 1, 2012, 6:41 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-01/facebookyet-to-friend-exchanges-as-nyse-nasdaq-vie-to-list-initial-offer.html (last visited
Feb. 22, 2013) (describing the benefits securing the Facebook IPO would provide
to NASDAQ) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
247. See Kayla Tausche, Nasdaq 100 Changes Listing Rules to Woo Facebook
IPO, CNBC.COM (Apr. 16, 2012, 1:59 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/47063617/
Nasdaq_100_Changes_Listing_Rules_to_Woo_Facebook_IPO (last visited Feb.
22, 2013) (describing how the NASDAQ stock market changed its rules to allow
a company to be listed on the Nasdaq-100 index in a quicker amount of time
after its IPO, which “w[as] a key component in Facebook’s choosing to go public
on Nasdaq instead of the New York Stock Exchange”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Kisling, supra note 246 (noting that the
NYSE and NASDAQ were competing to have Facebook IPO on their respective
exchanges).
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reputation as the go-to exchange for technology companies, a
$35,000 to $99,500 listing fee for the IPO itself, as well as the
infinitely more valuable “trading and brand value” that comes
from landing a big company like Facebook on one’s exchange.248
Additionally, revenues from IPOs accounted for 22% of
NASDAQ’s revenue in the third quarter of 2011.249 After news
broke that the Facebook IPO would take place on the NASDAQ
stock market, NASDAQ’s stock price rose and the NYSE’s fell—
evidence of the market’s position that securing the Facebook IPO
made NASDAQ a more valuable business.250
The Weissman court specifically provided that “efforts to
increase trading volume and company profit” constituted “nongovernmental activities that serve [the SRO’s] private business
interests.”251 The court also made it clear that activities
undertaken “in the service of NASDAQ’s own business, not the
government’s” do not warrant absolute immunity.252
A federal district court has stated that the fact that the SEC
approved the “pricing formula,” upon which NASDAQ’s “conduct
will be judged[,] does not automatically convert Nasdaq’s conduct
into an immunized ‘regulatory function.’”253 Thus, the SEC’s
approval of NASDAQ’s authority to “operate and oversee the
Nasdaq market” and the SEC’s approval of the NASDAQ Cross—
with knowledge that the Cross was to be used by NASDAQ to
effectuate IPOs—does not mean that such actions constitute
NASDAQ’s regulatory function.254

248.
249.
250.

Kisling, supra note 246.
Id.
See Evelyn Rusli, Facebook Is Said to Pick Nasdaq for I.P.O., N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 5, 2012, 1:50 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/05/facebookpicks-nasdaq-for-i-p-o/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2013) (“For Nasdaq, Facebook is not
just any listing.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
251. Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir.
2007) (en banc).
252. Id. at 1299.
253. Opulent Fund, L.P. v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. C-07-03683, 2007
WL 3010573, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007).
254. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167; see also NASDAQ Cross
Approval, supra note 219 (approving the implementation of the NASDAQ
Cross); supra notes 219–22 and accompanying text (describing the SEC’s
approval of the NASDAQ Cross).
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One could argue that NASDAQ, when effectuating IPOs, acts
only for itself in the service of its own private, for-profit business
and is therefore not entitled to absolute immunity. This makes
some sense considering the overwhelming benefit that NASDAQ,
as a private, for-profit corporation derives from IPOs generally,
and the Facebook IPO specifically.255 The fact that the SEC
approved the authority of NASDAQ to undertake IPOs, and even
approved of the specific method used by NASDAQ to effectuate
them, does not necessarily mean that such activities constitute a
regulatory function.256
3. Why a Court Should Find that NASDAQ Is Entitled to Absolute
Immunity for Its Actions During the Facebook IPO
A court will most likely find that IPOs fall within NASDAQ’s
regulatory function.257 Additionally, no matter how NASDAQ’s
actions during the Facebook IPO are reasonably characterized,
the absolute immunity shield should cover NASDAQ’s conduct
during the IPO.258 The cases brought against NASDAQ for its
conduct during the Facebook IPO have been consolidated in the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.259
a. IPOs Will Be Considered a Regulatory Function
A court in the Second Circuit will most likely find that IPOs
constitute a regulatory function performed by NASDAQ for four
255. See supra notes 247–50 and accompanying text (detailing the benefits
afforded to NASDAQ from the performance of IPOs).
256. Supra notes 253–54 and accompanying text.
257. See infra Part III.B.3.a (determining that IPOs should be considered a
regulatory function).
258. See supra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of SROs afforded absolute
immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims).
259. See SDNY Consolidation Order, supra note 7, at 43 (“[A]ll the NASDAQ
Actions are henceforth consolidated.”). Extensive searches did not reveal a
single instance of an SRO, in the financial sphere, being denied absolute
immunity in either the Second Circuit or S.D.N.Y. While this in no way ends the
determination, in a case such as this, with facts that weigh in favor of NASDAQ
being afforded absolute immunity, the S.D.N.Y. is unlikely to deny NASDAQ
absolute immunity given the Second Circuit precedent.
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reasons: (1) the broad delegation of authority provided to
NASDAQ to “operate and oversee” the NASDAQ Stock Market, a
delegation of authority approved of by the SEC;260 (2) the SEC’s
approval of the very method used by NASDAQ to effectuate IPOs,
a function explicitly discussed in the proposal calling for the
approval of the method by the SEC;261 (3) the fact that NASDAQ’s
statutory responsibilities are broad enough to encompass the
oversight of IPOs;262 and (4) the Second Circuit’s precedent
regarding SRO immunity.263
The NASD delegated authority to NASDAQ to “operate and
oversee” the NASDAQ stock market.264 The SEC approved this
delegation of authority.265 The Second Circuit, in DL Capital,
explicitly detailed NASDAQ’s authority to “develop, operate, and
maintain the Nasdaq Stock Market.”266 An SRO develops a stock
market by adding to it, and an SRO maintains a stock market, in
part, the same way, as companies delist over time forcing the
SRO to add more companies to maintain the market’s present
position. Therefore, the Second Circuit’s endorsement of
NASDAQ’s regulatory authority to develop and maintain the
NASDAQ stock market is an endorsement of the position that
IPOs constitute a regulatory function of NASDAQ.267 There is no
other way in which “develop” and “maintain” would make sense
in this context.268
NASDAQ effectuates IPOs via the NASDAQ Cross.269
NASDAQ’s proposal to the SEC requesting SEC approval of the
NASDAQ Cross contained numerous references to how NASDAQ
260. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167.
261. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim (referencing
the various ways in which it would affect IPOs).
262. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012).
263. See In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir.
2007) (stating that “action or inaction with respect to trading on the
Exchange . . . is indisputably within the [SRO’s] regulatory powers”).
264. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167.
265. Id.
266. DL Capital Grp., LLC v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., 409 F.3d 93, 95 (2d
Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. See supra notes 184–92 and accompanying text (providing an
explanation of the NASDAQ Cross).
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would use the Cross to effectuate IPOs, among other functions.270
The SEC approved NASDAQ’s proposal.271
The statutory responsibilities by which NASDAQ, as a
national securities exchange, must abide pursuant to 15 U.S.C.
§ 78f(b)(5)272 are broad enough to encompass the oversight of
IPOs—particularly the provisions that require NASDAQ to
“facilitat[e] transactions in securities,” “remove impediments to
and perfect the mechanism of a free and open market,” and
“protect investors and the public interest.”273 Arguably, IPOs
accomplish all three objectives: IPOs facilitate transactions in
securities and remove impediments to free and open markets by
creating an opportunity for investors to own equity in companies
previously unavailable for investment.274 IPOs also trigger
mandatory disclosure obligations for companies listed on national
securities exchanges, which “protect[s] investors and the public
interest,” by making available a wide variety of information not
previously accessible on a newly listed company.275
Finally, the Second Circuit has stated that “action or inaction
with respect to trading on the Exchange . . . is indisputably
within the NYSE’s regulatory powers”—a position that, given the
equivalent position that NASDAQ holds to the NYSE, affords
NASDAQ regulatory power over IPOs.276 This is because IPOs
unequivocally relate to “action or inaction with respect to trading”
on the NASDAQ stock market.277
A court, particularly one in the Second Circuit, would most
likely determine that NASDAQ, in the performance of an IPO, is
acting pursuant to its quasi-governmental regulatory function
270. See Proposal for NASDAQ Cross, supra note 194, passim (referencing
the various ways in which it would affect IPOs).
271. See NASDAQ Cross Approval, supra note 219 (approving the NASDAQ
Cross).
272. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(5) (2012).
273. Id.
274. See CHOI & PRITCHARD, supra note 13, at 392 (noting how IPOs have
“downside[s] for the company’s pre-existing owners[:] bringing in more equity
owners dilutes the potential upside return”).
275. See id. at 169 (noting that “Congress adopted mandatory disclosure for
companies with securities listed on a national securities exchange as part of the
Exchange Act of 1934”).
276. In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 2007).
277. Id.
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and is therefore entitled to absolute immunity.278 A court would
also most likely find that NASDAQ’s conduct during the
Facebook IPO, however feasibly characterized, would be
protected by its absolute immunity.279
IV. Regulatory Functions and Absolute Immunity: A New
Approach
Courts have trouble determining whether actions undertaken
by quasi-private SROs, such as NASDAQ, were undertaken
pursuant to their regulatory function or their “non-governmental”
“private business interests.”280 Occasionally, as may be the case
with IPOs, actions undertaken by quasi-private SROs such as
NASDAQ appear to constitute both regulatory action and private,
for-profit business activity, rendering such a distinction
impossible.281 Courts have devised a number of vague tests to
determine whether challenged actions were undertaken pursuant
to an SRO’s regulatory function or its nongovernmental private
business interest.282 Rather than detail a new test which, given
the complexity of the problem could be equally vague and
problematic, a legislative solution is required.283 The SEC should
278. See supra Part III.B.3.a (determining that IPOs are within NASDAQ’s
regulatory function).
279. See Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260,
263 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[A]bsolute immunity must be absolute.”), aff’d, 219 F.
App’x 91 (2d Cir. 2007); supra Part II.B.1 (demonstrating that absolute
immunity cannot be successfully defeated on the basis of activity characterized
as wrongful, improper, incorrect, badly motivated, inept, abusive, undertaken in
bad faith, undertaken with malice, fraudulent, or unlawful).
280. See supra Part II.B.1–2 (providing examples of SROs afforded and
denied absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims).
281. See supra Part III.B.1–2 (detailing arguments that effectuating IPOs
constitutes a regulatory function and a private, for-profit business activity).
282. See supra Part II.B.3 (providing examples of the vague tests employed
by the courts).
283. Earlier drafts of this Note provided the following new test: First, courts
should presume that actions undertaken by SROs warrant absolute immunity.
Second, should questions arise as to whether an SRO’s actions were undertaken
pursuant to its regulatory function or pursuant to its private, for-profit business
interests, this presumption may be rebutted after consideration of the following
factors: (1) the extent to which the SRO’s actions are analogous—substantively
and in all material respects—to actions taken by other nongovernmental private
corporations and (2) the substantial likelihood that the SRO would undertake
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apply a version of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s
(FDIC) living will approach to NASDAQ and equivalent SROs,
and it should remove the SRO’s absolute immunity for actions
taken pursuant to its regulatory function.284 Part IV, in subpart
A, introduces the new approach. Subpart B applies the new
approach to NASDAQ’s conduct during the Facebook IPO.
Subpart C provides counterarguments to the new approach.
A. The New Approach
The SEC should require SROs, like NASDAQ and the NYSE,
that both perform a regulatory function and possess
nongovernmental private business interests to detail a living will
providing their “contingency plans for resolution [of the SRO’s
activities] in the event of the [SRO’s] failure.”285 In cases like the
Facebook IPO, the living will could be activated in the event of
substantial, SRO-threatening, litigation. The SEC should require
that every year, NASDAQ and the NYSE detail the approximate
cost of running their national securities exchange for the next
year—the national securities exchange operating cost. The SEC
should further require that in the event of litigation against the
SRO, the SRO’s national securities exchange operating cost is
absolutely immune from liability under all circumstances. This
would ensure that, irrespective of the outcome of any litigation,
no matter how big, the national securities exchange would
continue operating uninterrupted for at least a year.286 This
would reduce the likelihood that a national securities exchange’s
the same action with prior knowledge that, in so doing, the SRO would not be
covered by absolute immunity.
284. FDIC Board Approves Final Rule Requiring Resolution Plans for
Insured Depository Institutions Over $50 Billion, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (Jan.
17, 2012), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2012/pr12003.html (last visited
Jan. 31, 2014) (announcing the FDIC’s approval of “a final rule requiring an
insured depository institution with $50 billion or more in total assets to submit
to the FDIC periodic contingency plans for resolution in the event of the
institution’s failure”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
285. Id.
286. See id. (noting that “resolution plans for large and complex [SROs] are
essential for their orderly and least-costly resolution” and will permit the SRO
and SEC, in this case, to “resolve the institutions in a manner that limits any
disruption from their insolvency” or litigation).

FRIEND THIS

1563

operations would be impacted by litigation, which could have a
“catastrophic . . . [effect
on]
investor
confidence
and
macroeconomic stability,” especially if such an exchange went
bankrupt.287 This would also serve to remove the damage that the
threat of large litigation could impose upon an SRO or national
securities exchange.
The SEC should also eliminate the SRO’s absolute immunity
for actions taken pursuant to its regulatory function. While
regulatory function immunity would no longer exist, SROs would
still be afforded absolute immunity for actions undertaken
pursuant to their adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions.288
This makes sense given that such a determination hinges upon
whether the conduct in question “share[d] . . . characteristics
[with] the judicial process,” a fairly straightforward analysis.289
B. The New Approach as Applied to the Facebook IPO
The new approach would permit parties damaged in the
Facebook IPO to bring suit directly against NASDAQ without
having to first demonstrate that NASDAQ’s actions were
undertaken pursuant to its nongovernmental private business
interests. While not an issue in this case, under the new
approach, the parties would first have to demonstrate that
NASDAQ’s actions were not undertaken pursuant to its
prosecutorial or adjudicatory function, an easy bar to clear in
most instances.290
This does not mean that NASDAQ is automatically liable for
the $500 million in damages alleged to have been lost as a result
of the “system difficulties” experienced by NASDAQ during the

287. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,714.
288. See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text (providing examples of
SROs afforded absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions).
289. Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 99 F.3d 49, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (citing
Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676, 688 (5th Cir.
1985) (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 510–13 (1978))).
290. See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text (providing examples of
SROs afforded absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions).
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IPO.291 The parties must first prevail on their federal securities
claims that NASDAQ “made material misrepresentations and
omissions concerning the capability of its technology and trading
platform” and their state law negligence claims that NASDAQ,
“in breach of duties owed to investors, negligently failed to
promptly and accurately process investors’ trades.”292
While NASDAQ would not be protected by absolute
immunity under the new approach, the plaintiffs’ claims must be
litigated in full, and NASDAQ would be afforded all of the
advantages of a defendant in the legal process.293 This would,
arguably, permit a much more efficient resolution of the claims
given that the substance of the claims could be litigated
immediately, rather than only after the question of whether
NASDAQ’s actions were undertaken pursuant to its regulatory
function is litigated and resolved: a murky undertaking at best.294
C. Counterarguments to the New Approach
The new approach attempts to address the conflict inherent
to SROs such as NASDAQ and the NYSE that balance their
private, for-profit interests with their quasi-governmental,
regulatory functions.295 The new approach is not without its own
problems, however. Primarily, the new approach is vulnerable to
the claim that removing an SRO’s absolute immunity for actions
291. McCrank, supra note 8. UBS alone lost over $350 million while Knight
Capital Group, Inc. (Knight) lost roughly $35.4 million. UBS Comment Letter,
supra note 206, at 2; Press Release, Knight Capital Grp., Inc., Knight Capital
Group Announces Consolidated Earnings of $0.04 Per Diluted Share For the
Second Quarter 2012 (July 18, 2012) [hereinafter Knight Press Release],
http://www.knight.com/investorRelations/pressReleases2.asp?compid=105070&r
eleaseID=1715693.
292. SDNY Consolidation Order, supra note 7.
293. Supra Part IV.A.
294. See supra Part II.B.3 (providing examples of the vague tests employed
by the courts to determine if an SRO is acting pursuant to its regulatory
function or nongovernmental private business interests).
295. See Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 500 F.3d 1293, 1296–97
(11th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (noting that SROs “enjoy absolute immunity when
performing governmental functions,” but SROs “cannot claim that immunity
when they perform non-governmental functions” or act in their “own interest as
a private entity”).
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taken pursuant to its regulatory function will unleash a torrent of
legal claims against the SRO. The result of such a move could be
threefold: the cost of operating an exchange and participating in
one could rise; the incentive to own and operate a national
securities exchange could fall; and national securities exchanges
could, under extreme circumstances, go bankrupt.
NASDAQ has stated that should it be forced to “bear all costs
associated with system malfunctions and the varying reactions of
market participants in their wake[,] . . . the cost of providing
exchange services would have to rise dramatically for all
investors to cover this material and new risk.”296 Such a result
would be unfortunate, but market forces—particularly
competition between the various national securities exchanges—
could function to minimize this risk.297 It is even possible that
members would be inclined to pay larger costs knowing that
should issues arise in the future, they would have an opportunity
to bring suit and receive compensation for any losses they
sustain.
A reduction in the incentive to own and operate a national
securities exchange poses a much larger problem. As NASDAQ
has stated “[h]undreds of billions of dollars of securities
transactions are matched through the systems of Nasdaq and
other exchanges every day.”298 Given the incredibly large volume
of transactions that SROs such as NASDAQ handle on a daily
basis, the potential for liability is incredibly large and likely.
Electronic trading today is so fast that massive liability can be
generated in a matter of hours or even seconds, as Knight Capital
Group’s $461 million in losses and near bankruptcy for the
improper installation of new software suggests.299 Even if the
296. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,714.
297. See Tausche, supra note 247 (describing how NASDAQ implemented a
rule change to make the Nasdaq stock market a more attractive venue for
Facebook’s IPO relative to the NYSE); Kisling, supra note 246 (noting that the
NYSE and NASDAQ were competing to have Facebook IPO on their respective
exchanges).
298. NASDAQ Proposal, supra note 17, at 45,714.
299. See John McCrank, Knight Capital Posts $389.9 Million Loss on
Trading Glitch, REUTERS (Oct. 17, 2012, 7:18 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/10/17/us-knightcapital-results-idUSBRE89G0HI20121017
(last
visited Feb. 14, 2014) (“The net results included $461.1 million in losses
associated with the glitch on August 1, when Knight, one of the biggest
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majority of the claims brought after the implementation of this
Note’s new approach were ultimately found to be meritless,
NASDAQ would expend a vast amount of its resources proving
that that is the case. This complaint is valid and potentially
lethal to the approach proposed here.
While no perfect solution could be devised initially, the SEC
and the SRO could monitor the claims as they come in and devise
additional rules tailored to blocking the promulgation of meritless
claims. In effect, this approach would statutorily provide for
absolute immunity in specific instances or scenarios. This could
be done in a fashion similar to NASDAQ’s existing Stock Market
Rules300 (the Rules), perhaps with detailed comments and
examples to illustrate the Rules’ application. NASDAQ’s Stock
Market Rules provide that, except as stated in Rule 4626(b),
“Nasdaq and its affiliates shall not be liable for any losses,
damages, or other claims arising out of the Nasdaq Market
Center or its use.”301 Rule 4626(b) provides, in part, “Nasdaq . . .
may compensate users of the Nasdaq Market Center for losses
directly resulting from the systems’ actual failure to correctly
process an order, Quote/Order, message, or other data, provided
the Nasdaq Market Center has acknowledged receipt of the order,
Quote/Order, message, or data.”302
Finally, while the national securities exchange would
continue to function if the SRO that “operates and oversees” the
exchange was bankrupted by the imposition of liability, given the
explicit protection afforded to the national securities exchange’s
operating cost, the event could still result in severe damage to
investor confidence and could undermine “macroeconomic

executors of stock trades in the United States, went live with new software that
had been improperly installed.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
300. NASDAQ Stock Market Rules, supra note 190, Rule 0115
(Applicability) (“These rules apply to all members and persons associated with a
member.”). The rules define a “member” or “Nasdaq Member” as “any registered
broker or dealer that has been admitted to membership in Nasdaq.” Id. at Rule
0120(i).
301. See id. at Rule 4626(b) (detailing that in some instances, liability is
predicated upon “Nasdaq determin[ing] in its sole discretion that [a] systems
malfunction or error was caused exclusively by Nasdaq” (emphasis added)).
302. Id. (emphasis added).
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stability.”303 It is even possible that a year might not be enough
time to figure out what action to take with respect to the national
securities exchange. This is also a valid concern. The continued
operation of the national securities exchange for at least a year,
however, would most likely provide the required buffer to devise
a workable solution for the future.
The new approach is not without fault. It can be fairly
criticized as potentially rendering SROs such as NASDAQ
vulnerable to a torrent of legal claims, many without merit.
Removing the initial regulatory function hurdle should allow
NASDAQ to more efficiently address such claims, however,
enabling it to focus on the underlying claim or claims at issue.
This approach also aligns the incentives of NASDAQ and its
members appropriately: NASDAQ has a vested interest in acting
as diligently as it can to avoid liability to its members in the
future, an interest that correspondingly benefits NASDAQ’s
members.
V. Conclusion
NASDAQ has two hats. Wearing its regulator hat, NASDAQ,
acting pursuant to its quasi-governmental prosecutorial,
adjudicatory, and regulatory functions, provides vital day-to-day
regulation and administration of a national securities exchange.
When wearing this hat, NASDAQ is absolutely immune from
common law liability.304 NASDAQ may be liable for limited
damages pursuant to its own Stock Market Rules, however.305
Wearing its corporate hat, NASDAQ, acting pursuant to its
nongovernmental private business interests, is beholden to its
173 million shareholders.306 When wearing this hat, NASDAQ is
fully liable for its actions.307
303. NASD Delegation Order, supra note 167; NASDAQ Proposal, supra
note 17, at 45714.
304. See supra Part II.B.1 (providing examples of SROs being afforded
absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims).
305. See supra notes 300–02 and accompanying text (providing a brief
description of NASDAQ’s Stock Market Rules, particularly Rule 4626
(Limitation of Liability)).
306. NASDAQ Annual Report, supra note 14, at 1, F-4.
307. See supra Part II.B.2 (providing examples of SROs being denied
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The crux of NASDAQ’s liability, therefore, depends upon
which hat NASDAQ is wearing for a given action. This
determination is relatively straightforward when NASDAQ is
performing either its prosecutorial or adjudicatory function.308
Distinguishing between NASDAQ’s nongovernmental private
business interests and its regulatory function is incredibly
problematic. Although a variety of vague tests exist to
differentiate between the two functions, none are convincing in
application, predictable for the parties involved, or an efficient
use of scarce judicial resources.309 This problem is especially
acute given the rapid pace of electronic trading, and the
increasingly global and the increasingly significant position
national securities exchanges, such as NASDAQ’s, occupy.310
The Facebook IPO is illustrative of this problem: due to
NASDAQ’s “system difficulties,” roughly $500 million in damages
was incurred by major market makers and broker dealers in a
matter of hours.311 Should NASDAQ face any liability for these
“system difficulties”?
Given the vital role that SROs such as NASDAQ play in both
the United States and global economy, the law cannot afford to be
vague about whether NASDAQ’s actions constitute a regulatory
function and thus warrant absolute immunity, or constitute a
private, for-profit business activity and are therefore exposed to
liability. Which hat NASDAQ is wearing matters, and it matters
a lot. Therefore, the SEC should not settle for the currently
ambiguous state of the law with respect to determining when an
SRO, such as NASDAQ, is acting pursuant to its regulatory
absolute immunity for a variety of actions and upon a variety of claims).
308. See supra notes 57–71 and accompanying text (providing examples of
SROs afforded absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to their
prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions).
309. See supra Part II.B.3 (providing examples of the vague tests employed
by the courts to determine if an SRO is acting pursuant to its regulatory
function or nongovernmental private business interests).
310. See What is NASDAQ?, NASDAQ OMX (2013), http://www.nasdaq
omx.com/aboutus/whatisnasdaq/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) (stating that
NASDAQ OMX Group is “the largest single liquidity pool for US equities and
the power behind 1 in 10 of the world’s securities transactions” (emphasis
added)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
311. See McCrank, supra note 8 (“Major market makers and broker
dealers . . . lost upward of $500 million in the IPO.”).
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function or its nongovernmental private business interests. The
SEC should adopt the new approach presented here and remove
the SRO’s absolute immunity for actions taken pursuant to its
regulatory function. The SEC should also require SROs such as
NASDAQ and the NYSE to adopt a living will specifying the
national securities exchange operating costs for the following
year. That pool of money should be, unconditionally, entitled to
absolute immunity. This method ensures the continuity of the
national securities exchanges despite any liability imposed;
preserves judicial resources by allowing the parties to litigate the
heart of their claims against SROs initially; and aligns the SRO’s
incentives with their members—both of whom benefit from a
diligent and risk-averse national securities exchange.

